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The communication of messages of the impending impact of some natural
disaster agent can play a key role in averting natural catastrophe. This
article examines the social processes involved in disaster warnings which
function to elicit evacuation in such threat situations. These processes and
the role of the mass media in forming situational definitions requisite for
evacuation are examined in reference to data gathered in Rapid City, South
Dakota where on June 9, 1972 a flash flood produced a major disaster.
.~. 
Warnings connected with the impact of some natural
hazard agent, for example, tornadoes, hurricanes, or flash
floods, have been conceptualized as a social process com-
prised of three basic elements: evaluation, dissemination, and
response (Williams, 1964; McLuckie, 1970). Evaluation en-
compasses those processes taking place from the time of
detection of the environmental hazard to the point at which
some means are employed to convey a message to the
endangered community of the probable impact of the natural
agent. Conveying such a message to the community is
[25]
dissemination. Response is defined as that behavior on the
part of warning recipients which follows warnings heard.
The process of warning, then, is not seen as limited solely
to the dissemination of a threat message. Rather it includes
all behavior connected with the evaluation of threat, warning
dissemination, and public response to it. The message itself
functions primarily as the mechanism whereby individuals
and groups within an endangered community may perform
adaptive behavior to anticipated stress input into the social
system by some natural agent.1 Such adaptive behavior to
negative short-term changes in the natural environment are
accomplished as consequences of varied community-specific
organizational and technological mechanisms which allow for
such anticipatory adaptive behavior. For example, the use of
river gauges and radar by the National Weather Service may
provide the means whereby a potential flash flood can be
detected. Community decision points, typically within or-
ganizations, then provide the means whereby the information
is conveyed to the media or other dissemination agents
within a community. Community preparedness plans may
then specify the procedures to be followed whereby warnings
are issued to the community in general.2 2
It is the purpose of the paper, on the basis of existing
research and theory, to generate a formulation of individual
response to short-term natural hazard warnings. Short-term
natural hazard warnings may be conceptualized as any public
warning of the immediate, or imminent, impact of some
natural hazard agent (see Mack and Baker, 1961; Williams,
1964). They differ from warnings in general only in terms of
the shorter amount of time they allow for response. Such was
the nature of the warnings issued to the residents of Rapid
City, South Dakota prior to the flash flood which struck that
community on June 9, 1972. Response to those warnings is
the focus of this study. Tornado and flash flood warnings are
typical examples of natural hazard warnings of quick impact.
Warnings of long-term or progressive floods, in that they may
[26]
be issued over a period of several days, exemplify a natural
hazard of long-term impact in which warnings do not require
immediate response.
In an effort to explicate the consequences in response to
differences in the warnings themselves, a model based upon,
but not solely limited to, warning-specific variables is
advanced. Emphasis is placed on the characteristics of the
warnings themselves, as well as on the interpretation given to
those warnings by recipients. The model, then, is assessed in
terms of data gathered from a random sample of the June 9th




On Friday, June 9, 1972, Rapid City was hit by a flash
. flood in which over 230 persons lost their lives. It had been
raining most of the day and as a consequence most people
were in their homes that evening. At 7:30 p.m. the mayor
’ 
was advised of a flood warning by the National Weather
Service, and thirty minutes later the city and county civil
defense emergency operations center had opened. At 9:30
radio and TV stations were advised that heavy rains would
continue to fall until about midnight. Radio broadcasts at
10:00 spoke of the continuation of the heavy rains, and by
10:30 evacuation advisements went out over the media for
the low-lying areas of the city. By that time, however, the
canyons above the city were already flooded and residents
upstream along Rapid Creek had already begun to lose their
lives. At 10:45 Canyon Lake Dam, a recreational dam on the
upstream western margin of the city, ruptured. By 12:15
a.m. the flood crest reached the downtown area. (For further
details of the actual events, see U.S. Department of Com-




This research seeks to answer the question of how, on the
basis of differences in the warnings received, does the social
process function whereby evacuation takes place. Response
to warnings is seen as a consequence of the interaction
between the transmitter of a message and its recipient. The
key to this interaction is seen as meaning, the subjective
interpretive response by the warning recipient to the warning
received. Hence, response develops out of the interpretation
of the warning or out of the ascribed meaning of the warning
by the actor. The question of how someone comes to
evacuate his home, on the basis of short-term warnings, is,
then, approached essentially through the symbolic inter-
actionist perspective. This perspective has been persuasively
stated by Blumer (1966: 537) where he notes, &dquo;symbolic
interaction involves interpretation, or ascertaining the mean-
ing of the acticns or remarks of the other person, and
definition, or ccnveying indications to another person as to
how he should act.&dquo; An interpretation of a natural hazard
warning which is conducive to evacuation proceeds in the
midst of a somewhat unaccustomed situation in which the
same &dquo;object&dquo; may mean different things to different
persons. Gillespie (1972: 245) has shown that in circum-
stances of this type it is the definition of that situation which
must be seen as the intervening mechanism between the
stimulus and behavioral response.
Explaining warning belief. If it is to be argued that the
definition of a situation is requisite for action, it follows that
a definitional requirement for evacuation is warning belief.
Past research has shown warning belief to be a function of
four communication-related variables: communication mode,
content, perceived certainty, and confirmation.3 The manner
in which the warning is communicated, including messages
received through the media, telephone, in face-to-face conver-
[28] 
sation, and so forth, can be labeled &dquo;communication mode.&dquo;
Williams ( 1964) has shown that different channels of
communication have different degrees of authoritativeness,
credibility, and legitimacy for warning recipients. Belief, as a
function of communication mode, has also been shown to be
greater for warnings delivered in a personal manner than
those communicated by some impersonal medium (see
Clifford, 1956; Moore, 1963). It was therefore postulated
that warnings directed at specific individuals rather than
warnings for some general aggregate, e.g., &dquo;person-specific&dquo;
warnings, will be believed to a greater extent than warnings
del ivered in any other mode.
The literature also suggests that warning-belief is a func-
tion of two components of the content of the warning (see
Mack and Baker, 1961; Clifford, 1956). The first is the
subjective interpretation of &dquo;perceived warning certainty.&dquo;
That is, belief has been shown to be higher in instances when
warning recipients perceive a high degree of certainty in the
. transmission of the warning issued, than in those cases when
certainty is perceived as not that great. This, then, was
advanced as another postulate. The second aspect of warning
content makes a distinction between general and specific
information. The actual &dquo;warning content&dquo; or information
contained in the warning was also postulated to foster greater
belief when it consisted of specific information rather than
general information. Hence, the degree of warning specificity
represents another important dimension in the model.
A number of authors (Mack and Baker, 1961; Withey,
1962; Drabek and Boggs, 1968; Drabek, 1969; Drabek and
Stephenson, 1971) have suggested that warning belief is in
addition a function of &dquo;warning confirmation.&dquo; Here the
focus is upon the act of obtaining additional information
concerning the information obtained in the original warning.
As Mack and Baker ( 1961 ) .have stated, &dquo;interpretation of the
meaning of the signal depends ... upon ... validation.&dquo; It
was, therefore, postulated that warning belief is also a
function of the confirmation process.
[29]
Explaining warning confirmation. Warning confirmation is,
itself, a function of several relevant variables. For instance,
Drabek and Stephenson (1971) found that families which are
separated at the time a warning is received seek to confirm
the message more so than do united families. It was
postulated that &dquo;situational context,&dquo; defined as whether or
not the nuclear family is together at the time a warning is
received, is related to warning confirmation. It was also
proposed that confirmation is a direct function of perceived
warning certainty. Danzig et al. (1958) have shown this to be
the case. Furthermore, communication mode has been
determined to be a predictor of confirmation (see Drabek,
1969; Drabek and Stephenson, 1971). We postu lated that
person-specific warnings would have a higher probability of
being followed by confirmation than warning obtained in
some other manner. It was also postulated that specific
warnings issued for a recipient’s own location would foster an
attempt at confirmation more than would general warnings.
It is argued that such warnings would create a greater
motivation for action and a consequent disposition for
seeking a definition of the situation.
Explaining warning response. Four additional relationships
were included in the model. The first of these is that specific
own-area warnings would invoke evacuation to a greater
extent than general warnings. A direct relationship was
postulated then between area-specific warnings (warning
content) and evacuation (see Moore et al., 1963; Wilkinson
and Ross, 1970). In addition, a relationship was seen between
the communication medium carrying the warning and evacua-
tion. Moore (1963) found that evacuation has a greater
probability of occurring after person-specific warning than
after warning communicated in some other way. It was
postulated, therefore, that such is the case.
Repeatedly, although not in studies of short-term warning,
it has been shown that families evacuate as units and not
[30]
individuals (see Danzig et al., 1958; Moore et al., 1963;
Spiegel, 1964; Drabek, 1969). Situational context, as here
defined, was postulated in addition to be a predictor of
evacuation. Specifically, it was hypothesized that warnings
received in the context of a united nuclear family would have
a greater probability of being followed by evacuation than
those received when the family unit was separated. Returning
to our original assumption that the definition of a situation is
requisite for action, it was postulated that evacuation is also a
direct function of warning belief, that is, belief in the threat
of impending disaster.
The preceding relationships constitute the model on which
the analysis was based. The exogenous, or explanatory,
variables are: warning content (X1), communication mode
(X2), situational context (X3), and perceived warning cer-
tainty (X4). The dependent, or endogenous, variables are:
warning confirmation (Y~ ), warning belief (Y2), and warning
response (Y3). The interrelationships among these variables
are displayed diagrammatically in Figure 1. The model, then,
is a composite of those communication variables which past
research has shown as central to disaster warning situations
(warning content and communication mode); those social-
psychological variables which stand as key factors in such
situations (perceived warning certainty and belief); warning
confirmation and situational context (two key sociological
variables as revealed by past research); and warning response.
The model, which is designed to have applied import, is
therefore a composite of intrapersonal, contextual, and
behavioral variables. However, in a theoretical sense the
model adheres to the symbolic interactionist perspective: the
communication variables are central to both definitional
situations and behavior and that the former are predictive of
the latter.
The structural equations linking the exogenous and endog-
enous variables in the model are:
[31] 
Where X1 = warning content; XZ 2 communication mode; X3 3 situational context;
X4 = perceived warning certainty; Yl = warning confinnation; Y2 = warning belief;
and Y3 = warning response.
Figure 1: NONRECURSIVE MODEL OF RESPONSE TO SHORT-TERM
NATURAL HAZARD WARNINGS
Y1 ={310+{311X1 +{312X2 +{313X3 +{314X4 +E1 [1]
Y2 ~20 + ~21 X1 + {322X2 + {324X4 + r 21 Y + E2 [2]
Y3 - ~30 + ~31 X1 + a32X2 + ~33X3 + r32Y2 + E3 [31
where the {3¡j’S are the effects of the exogenous variables, the
r;~’s represent the effects of the endogenous variables on
each other, and the Ej’s are disturbance terms. In the absence
of any theoretically compelling rationale for preferring one
functional form over another, we use linear relations as a first
approximation for our model. No assumptions are made
concerning the independency of the disturbances in the
model, and while relaxing this assumption increases the
complexity of the estimation technique needed to solve for
the model’s parameters, we gain the advantage of recognizing
that our model may exclude important unidentified variables
[32]
which may influence confirmation, belief, and response. In
other words, what we lose in ease of computation is more
than compensated for by gains in conceptual rigor.
It is argued, then, that warning confirmation is a com-
pound function of the effects of warning content, communi-
cation mode, situational context, and perceived warning
certainty. Warning belief is a function of warning content,
communication mode, perceived warning certainty, and
warning confirmation. And lastly, evacuation is a function of




The population was defined as adult heads of households
and their spouses, living in the June 9th flood plain, within
the city limits of Rapid City. A population of 1,958 preflood
dwelling units was enumerated by a review of tax records and
mobi le-home park-registration lists. A systematic 8 to 1
random sample was drawn yielding a sample of 244.4 Of
these, 11 were occupied by persons not in town at the time of
the flood, and 10 were vacant at the time of the flood. The
sample size was, therefore, reduced to 223. Of these,
interviews were completed with 188, or 83.3% of the
sample.’
In reference to each warning which respondents received,
variables were measured with the following questions. Warn-
ing content (X1 ) was ascertained by the question &dquo;What did
they say?&dquo; Pretesting revealed the categories of response
which were used. These were: heavy rains; water rising, not
sure how serious; river flooding, possible danger; river
flooding in some other place; dam broke; river flooding,
approaching your area; and other. Aside from the &dquo;other&dquo;
category, the last three possible choices for this analysis were
coded as &dquo;1: specific own-area warnings,&dquo; while all others
[33]
were coded as &dquo;0: general or other-area warnings.&dquo; In this
way warning content was dichotomized for analysis.
Communication mode (X2 ) was measured by the question
&dquo;How did you get th is message?&dquo; Responses were dichoto-
mized into &dquo;1: person-specific&dquo; which included telephone
and face-to-face interaction, and &dquo;0: mass communicated&dquo;
which included TV and radio communications. Situational
context (X3 ) was measured by the question &dquo;Were all the
members of your immediate family, who were living with
you at that time, with you when you received the warning or
message?&dquo; Responses were, of course, dichotomous, with &dquo;1:
yes,&dquo; and &dquo;0: no.&dquo; Perceived warning certainty (X4) was
measured by showing the respondent a card on which was
displayed a scale of 1 to 6. The question asked was &dquo;How
certain did they seem about the information they were
giving, on a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 represents ’they were
very uncertain,’ and 6 represents ’they were very certain.’ 
&dquo;
Although &dquo;certainty&dquo; is conceptually a continuous variable,
preliminary analysis demonstrated little variance across this
6-point scale with roughly 50% of the respondents scoring in
the highest category. As a result the scale was dichotomized
between those with complete certainty in the warning, a
score of 6, and those with less certainty, a score of 5 or less.
The former was coded &dquo;1&dquo; while the latter was coded &dquo;0.&dquo;
Warning confirmation (Y1 ) was measured by the question
&dquo;Did you make any attempt to obtain additional information
after you heard that message?&dquo; Responses were recorded as
no, or in terms of behavior constituting confirmation,
whether it was calling a relative, continuing to listen to the
radio for more information, and so forth. For analysis-in
that in no one warning was a confirmation attempt unsuc-
cessful, except in fewer than 4% of the cases-responses were
dichotomized as &dquo;1: yes,&dquo; or &dquo;0: no.&dquo;
Warning belief (Y2) was measured by showing the respond-
ent, once again, the scale card, and asking &dquo;How would you
rank the extent to which you believed this warning, on a
[34]
scale of 1 to 6, where 1 represents ’totally disbelieved’ and 6
represents ’totally believed.’ 
&dquo; 
Empirically the scale failed to
adequately discriminate its entire range. Since approximately
50% of the respondents fell into the &dquo;totally believed&dquo;
category, this scale was dichotomized between 5 and 6 so
that respondents are categorized &dquo;1: total belief&dquo; as repre-
sented originally by a code of 6, versus &dquo;0: less than total
belief&dquo; represented originally by codes 1-5. Warning response
(Y3 ) was measured by the question &dquo;What were your first
actions immediately thereafter?&dquo; Responses were recorded
verbatim and for this analysis were dichotomized as &dquo;1:
evacuated,&dquo; and &dquo;0: no evacuation.&dquo;6
ESTIMATION
The structural model presented in Figure 1 does not make
the assumption of the independency of the disturbance
terms; that is, the possibility that the unknown factors,
represented by the e~’s, influence the endogenous variables is
allowed for in this research. Unless the disturbances are
independent, the application of ordinary least squares (OLS)
estimating techniques to the structural equations will result
in estimators which are biased and inconsistent. To avoid this
possibility, indirect least squares (I LS) were used to estimate
the structural equations of our model. (For a simplified
discussion and further details on I LS, see Wonnacott and
Wonnacott, 1970.) ,
To arrive at the I LS estimates it was first necessary to
express the model in terms of the reduced form equations.
This is to say that equation 1 is substituted into equation 2,
and then solved so that only the exogenous variables appear
on the right-hand side of the equation. Likewise, the reduced
form of equation 2 is substituted into equation 3 and solved
for the exogenous variables. The resulting reduced form
equations are:
[35]
Yi = 7o + 7i xi + ’Y 2 X2 + 73X3 + 74X4 + V~ 1 [4]
y 2 7rO + jr, X 1 + 7r2 x 2 + 7T3 x 3 + 7T4 x 4 +V 2 [5]
Y3 xo + X 1 xi + X 2x2 + X 3x3 + X 4 X4 + v 3 [6]
where
7o 01 o [7a] l
’Y, = 13’1 1 [7b]
’Y2 = 13, 2 [7c]
’Y3 = 13’3 17did
^f4 = 014 we]
v = 61 [7f] I
7ro = 920 + r2lgl 0 [7g]
7Tl = 021 + r2lgll 1 [7h]
7T2 = 022 + r2lgl2 z
1T3 = r 211313 z
lr4 = 024 + r2lOl4 [7k]
v2=r21E1+E2 [71]
’XO = 030 + 1’32920 + lr32r2l 010 [7m]
xl = 031 + lr32021 + 1’32r2l 011 1 [7n]
X2 = 1332 + r 321322 + ]r32r2lgl2 [7o]
X3 = 033 + r32r2lgl 3 [7p]
X4 = r32024 + r32r2lPl4 [7q]
V3 = r32r2l6l + r 3262 +el . [7r]
Since with the reduced form disturbances, the vi s, are
uncorrelated, we may estimate the reduced form equations
employing OLS techniques. Using the OLS estimates of these
[36]
questions, one may then solve by substitution for the I LS
estimates of the structural equations. Denoting the OLS
estimates with a caret and the derived I LS estimates with an
asterisk, we have
ø10 = 1’0 [8a]
~ii=7i [8b]
~12=72 [8c]
Al 3 ^f3 [8d]
014 ^f4 [Be]
Ø20 = 7TO - <~3TO~ . [8f]
Ø21 = &dquo;l ~ (~37~ ~3) [8g]
Ø22 ’r2 - ~372/73) [8h]
024 ’r4 - (~374/73) [8i]
r2l &dquo;3/-f3 [8i]
030 = ~0 ’ (~4~o~4) [8k]
031 = À1 - (À41f1 ~4) 1811
032 = À2 - (~4 ~2~4~ [8m]
Ø33 = X3 - ~4~373~474~ [8n]
~32 ~ X4/7T4’ 1801
All of the exogenous and endogenous variables in the
model are binary, with all variables being coded as either 1 or
0. Therefore, unstandardized coefficients, in that they have a
straightforward probabilistic interpretation, are given as the
estimated parameters of the model (Goldberger, 1968). The
standardization of the estimated coefficients for the struc-
tural equations, as is the usual practice in such an analysis,
would not have contributed to the interpretation of the
[37]
model. While the structural parameters have a clear inter-
pretation as contributions to the linear probability function,
it can be shown that in binary variable regression, when the
dependent variable is dichotomous, the homoscedasticity
assumption concerning the disturbance variance is untenflble.
Hence, the O LS estimates of the reduced form equations do
not have the minimum variance property normally associated
with OLS estimates (Beck, 1972; Theil, 1970; Goldberger,
1964). However, even in the face of heteroscedasticity the
OLS estimates are unbiased, and there is no substantial loss
of information concerning the model’s parameters, although
they are somewhat less efficient.
In recursive models the adequacy of a structural equation
can be assessed by the magnitude of the squared multiple
correlation coefficient. The interpretation of this coefficient,
however, when applied to models such as ours is inherently
ambiguous. Hooper (1959) has suggested using the mean
square canonical correlation, or trace correlation, as a
desirable measure of the association between the exogenous
and endogenous variables.’ 7 The trace varies between -1.0
and 1.0, and can be interpreted as the proportion of the
variance in the endogenous variables accounted for by the
nonrandom variance in the exogenous variables. The trace (p)
is defined as
k
p -2 k Pi 2 M
i=1
where p, is the ith of k canonical correlations, and there will
be as many canonical correlations as there are endogenous
variables in the model.8 Whereas p2 is the population trace
coefficient, a consistent estimator, r2, can be derived by
utilizing the sample analog to equation 9.
[38]
FINDINGS
The ordinary least squares estimates of the reduced form
equations for the first, second, third, and fourth warnings
received were obtained, and these estimates were substituted
into equations 8a through 80 to obtain the I LS estimates of
the structural equations.’ Analysis ceased with the fourth
warning because the sample size became too small for
analysis.
Table 1 tabulates the sample means for our seven variables
by warning number which refers to the frequency and
sequence of respondent-specific warnings received, and not to
any particular set of warnings issued in the pre-impact
community. If the fourth warning is ignored, we find that
there is an increase in the degree of perceived warning
certainty, warning belief, and proportion of families evacu-
ating as the number of warnings received increases. It would
appear, then, that families who received multiple warnings
tend to believe these communications, perceive greater
TABL E 1
SAMPLE MEANS BY WARNING NUMBER
NOTE: The sequence of warnings received varied for each respondent. That is,
respondents received different warnings from different sources at different times.
Warning number, as it is used here, therefore, refers to the number and sequence
of respondent-specific warnings, and not any specific set of warnings issued in the
pre-impact community.
39]
certainty in them, and act upon these beliefs in so far as
evacuation is concerned.
The trace correlations, average intercorrelations among the
exogenous variables, and I LS estimates of the parameters for
the first, second, third, and fourth warnings are presented in
Table 2. To summarize the degree of multicollinearity we
computed the average of the six bivariate correlations among
the four exogenous variables.1 ° As can be seen from Table 2,
in no case did this average exceed .3597 from which we
concluded that our analysis is not confounded by a high
degree of correlation among the exogenous terms. No trace
for the warnings was as high as hoped.
As ascertained by the trace correlations, the exogenous
variables in the model accounted for 15%, 11%, 10%, and
21%, respectively, of the variance in the endogenous vari-
ables. However, this is not as discouraging as it may seem
when considered in light of some of the estimated coeffi-
cients within the model.
Situational context and perceived warning certainty were,
for all practical purposes, of no predictive value for warning
confirmation on any of the warnings examined. The relation-
ship between warning content and warning confirmation did
not hold either, except for the second warning, and then it
was only of marginal magnitude and in the opposite direction
of that predicted (~3~ ~ 1 - -.1631). From this one might
impute a general attitude of &dquo;I’m safe, but I’ll watch TV to
see what’s going on.&dquo; However, because the relationship was
relatively weak and appeared in only one of the four
warnings examined, it was dismissed as being of no real
theoretical significance. Communication mode, on the other
hand, did emerge as a moderate predictor of warning
confirmation. Warnings received over the media-rather than
person-specific warnings as predicted-increased the proba-
bility that a person would seek warning confirmation.
Respectively, for each of the four warnings examined, 01 2
was -.1823, -.2401, -.1218, and -.4879. It appears that














































is strong after several warnings have been received. The
important issue, however, is what this means in relation to
warning belief.
Consistently, warning confirmation was a strong predictor
of belief. Respectively, by warning number, f 21 was .6585,
.9352, .7205, and .5311. If mass-communicated warnings
have a high probability of being followed by confirmation,
this suggests an interesting function which the media provide.
Confirmation can be the result of two different phenomena,
both of which accomplish the same end. An overt behavior
may be made to obtain confirmatory information by
continuing to watch or listen to the media with the specific
intent of seeking confirmation. However, confirmatory in-
formation may be obtained by involuntary means, e.g.,
&dquo;involuntary confirmation,&dquo; if you will, by a lack of change
in behavior by continuing to use the media, but not in
response to warnings and without the intent of obtaining
additional information. In either case confirmation will result
which is, in itself, a strong predictor of belief.
In and of itself, however, communication mode had no
predictive value for belief regardless of warning number.
Perceived warning certainty, on the other hand, did have a
fair degree of predictive value for warning belief across
warnings. Coefficients were of moderate magnitude; respec-
tively, by warning number, 024 was .3259, .2041, .3196, and
.1998. Estimates of the relationship (Ø21) between warning
content and belief were, respectively, -.0478, .0821, and
.2259. It appears, therefore, that specific own-area warnings
gain marginal predictive value for warning belief only after
several warnings are heard.
The variable, response, we dichotomized as &dquo;evacuation&dquo;
versus &dquo;nonevacuation&dquo; and was, of course, the endogenous
variable of prime concern in the analysis. As a predictor of
evacuation, specific own-area warnings, e.g., warning content,
had moderate value (a3 ~ _ .3021) for the first warning. For
all ensuing warnings, however, it was of minimal influence;
[42]
for the second through fourth warnings, respectively, Ø31 was
.1118, .1000, and -.1517. Communication mode, however,
was of greater predictive value across warnings. Ø32’ respec-
tively, for the first, second, and third warnings was .2320,
.2294, and .1757. Whereas for the fourth warning, person-
specific warnings had a .6941 probability of being followed
by evacuation. The same increasing trend in predictive value
was also true, for all practical purposes, of warning belief.
Respectively, by warning number, r32 was .1799, -.0330,
.3403, and .5604. Surprisingly, situational context, e.g.,
whether the family was together or not, had no predictive
value for evacuation, Ø33 never exceeded .0633, just as it did
not have any predictive value for confirmation.
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION
It was postulated that evacuation is a function of warning
content, communication mode, situational context, and
warning belief. Warning belief was postulated to be a
function of warning content, communication mode, per-
ceived warning certainty, and warning confirmation. In
addition, warning confirmation was seen as a function of
warning content, communication mode, situational context,
and perceived warning certainty.
_ 
Although the explanatory power of the overall model was
’
low, the findings of the analysis seem quite relevant to
furthering our understanding of some of the social processes
through which individuals evacuate in response to short-term
natural hazard warnings.
Perhaps the most obvious conclusion which can be drawn
from this analysis is that response to natural hazard warnings
is a complex social process when a series of warnings is
considered. Confirmation, belief, and response to warnings
differ not only in terms of some of the exogenous variables
introduced into the analysis, but also in terms of the number
[43]
of warnings received. This is to say that what may constitute
meaningful relationships between variables is very different
for the first warning received than the second, and so forth.
It was obvious that the predictive value of several exogenous
variables changed over the number of warnings received.
Specifically, own-area warnings were a strong predictor of
warning belief only after several such warnings were heard.
Likewise, mass-communicated warnings did not become a
strong predictor of warning confirmation until several warn-
ings had been heard. The differential predictive value of the
exogenous variables over warnings was most obvious when
evacuation was taken as the dependent variable. Warning
belief increased its predictive value for evacuation as more
warnings were heard. Person-specific warnings, over the first
several warnings, moderately predicted evacuation; however,
after several warnings had been heard, it demonstrated a
strong predictive value for evacuation. Conversely, however,
specific own-area warnings, in and of themselves, were only
of moderate predictive value for evacuation only on the first
warning; in subsequent warnings they became of marginal
value. This suggests that evacuation is not merely a fu nction
of hearing a warning and responding. A portion of the
populace evacuates in this stimulus-response manner; how-
ever, for the remainder of the population evacuation is a
much more complex process. The implications of these
findings will be discussed shortly.
Only two exogenous variables remained consistent
predictors over all warnings; this was the case when warning
belief was taken as the dependent variable. Perceived warning
certainty was a consistent, although only moderate, predictor
of warning belief, while warning confirmation was a
consistent strong predictor of warning belief over all
warnings. This, however, is not surprising. Past research has
shown that interpretation of a warning as valid is a direct
function of the certainty, or lack of ambiguousness, in the
warning (Clifford, 1956; Mack and Baker, 1961). In addition,
[44]
defining the situation as one of potential danger has been
shown to be a gradual process which confirmation will
accelerate (Drabek and Stephenson, 1971).
Several variables had no predictive value for one or several
of the endogenous variables regardless of warning number.
Situational context did not account for any of the variance in
evacuation. Perhaps this was due to the urgency of the flash
flood situation. Whether or not the family was united made
no difference in terms of evacuation if evacuation had to be
accomplished quickly. In immediate stress situations response
patterns may be, therefore, quite different from situations
where stress is slow in mounting. In the latter, situational
context has explained response (see Drabek, 1969; Drabek
and Boggs, 1968; Drabek and Stephenson, 1971); however,
that it offered no explanatory power in this study of an
immediate stress situation further illustrates the hetero-
geneity of threat across a variety of hazard types, and the
influence this can have on differential response patterns.
Communication mode never attained predictive value for
warning belief. It was postulated that warnings obtained in a
face-to-face manner would be believed to a greater extent
than mass-communicated warnings. However, this analysis
does suggest that belief is more a function of the perceived
certainty with which the warning is delivered and the
confirmation of that warning, rather than how the warning is
delivered.
Situational context, perceived warning certainty, and
warning content were not related to warning confirmation as
postulated. Again referring to the immediateness of the
situation, perhaps the heretofore predictors of confirmation
do not hold relevance when response must be almost
immediate. It is a major conclusion, therefore, that the
variable of time is of central importance in explaining
behavior elicited by warnings in predisaster settings. Perhaps
this variable may be a means whereby warning-related
behavior may be integrated into some middle-range theory
applicable across different general types of disasters.
[45]
In terms of all variables considered, however, this analysis
has revealed the main process whereby warnings were cause
for individuals to evacuate prior to Rapid City’s June 9th
flood. This is not to say that other variables and relationships
were not important. Rather, on the basis of this analysis, a
series of several relationships stand out as the main process.
After several warnings had already been received, person-
specific warnings had a strong direct effect on predicting
evacuation; for the fourth warning Ø32 was .6941. Mass-
communicated warnings, however, had their effect on evacua-
tion through a series of relationships. After several t prior
warnings had already been received, mass-communicated
warnings were a strong predictor of warning confirmation;
the fourth warning 01 2 was -.4879. Warning confirmation
was itself a consistently strong predictor of belief; across all
warnings, r2 ~ ranged from .5311 1 to .9352. Warning belief,
after several warnings had already been received, was a strong
predictor of evacuation, r32 for the fourth warning was
.5604.
This suggests that evacuation could have been maximized
in Rapid City had more warnings been issued over the media.
Such a process would have fostered warning confirmation
either by voluntary means, where warning recipients purpose-
fully sought additional information, or involuntary means
(see Drabek, 1971), where confirmation took place not
because of any concerted effort to obtain additional informa-
tion, but simply because many persons continued to use the
media for entertainment purposes. Either type of confirma-
tion would have ultimately fostered belief, and eventually led
to evacuation after the receipt of several warnings to
evacuate. I n other words, evacuation seems to be a fu nction
of warning belief which appears, itself, to be a function of
confirmation. Confirmation, then, could have been maxi-
mized-either by voluntary or involuntary means-by con-
tinued warnings over the media.
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It can therefore be stated that evacuation is a function of
some additive process of internalizing warning information
over a series of warnings. Further research is needed to
specify such an additive model which considers such variables
as time, warning number in reference to specific relationships
between a greater variety of variables like those considered
here, and type of disaster agent. Only after such a model is
developed and tested can we hope to add any degree of
closure to a theory capable of explaining and predicting
response to warnings of impending disaster.
NOTES
1. It was Barton (1963) who conceptualized natural disaster as a segment of
collective stress which he defined as large unfavorable change in the inputs of
some social system.
2. It is not the purpose of this paper to review the organizational and
technological mechanisms which comprise warning dissemination. See Anderson
(1965, 1969, 1970), McLuckie (1970), and Yutzy (1964) for a discussion of these
aspects of the warning process.
3. Warning source, e.g., whether the warning was from an official or
nonofficial source, regretfully, had to be excluded from the analysis. Across all
warnings analyzed, only an average of 5% were from official sources, e.g., police,
fire department, mayor, national guard, and so forth. Warning source (Clifford,
1956; Moore et al., 1963; Williams, 1964 ; Drabek, 1969; Wilkinson, 1970) has
been shown to be related to warning belief, confirmation, and evacuation.
4. Whether the household head or his/her spouse were interviewed was made
to vary randomly. Interviewing was conducted through the inclusive dates of
August 5 to August 22, 1972. It was completed by the principal investigator and a
team of hired interviewers from a local college with a pretested interview
schedule.
5. Of the 16.7% not interviewed: three refused to be interviewed, eight
could not be located ; four were never at home when interviewers called; two were
on vacation at the time of the study; 13 had moved too far away to be
interviewed; and five were dead.
6. The endogenous variable of evacuation was inherently dichotomous, as
were several other exogenous variables, e.g., situational context. In addition
several variables were natural response dichotomies, e.g., perceived warning
certainty and warning belief. The analysis, therefore, is a linear probability
function analysis which allows each estimated coefficient to be interpreted as a
simple probability function.
[47]
7. A canonical correlation is a generalized multiple correlation. See Van de
Geer (1971) and Hooper (1959) for a discussion.
8. More specifically, the total number of canonical correlations will be equal
to the number of variables in the smallest set being correlated. Here the
exogenous set contained four variables and the endogenous set was composed of
three variates. There were, therefore, three canonical correlations entered in the
computations for the trace correlation. 
9. Copies of tables giving the OLS estimates of the reduced form equations
and intercorrelations are available from the senior author. 
10. The average intercorrelation was computed from 
ave= (m(m-1)/2 &Sigma;2rij)&frac12; i&ne;j,
where m is the number of exogenous variables in the model and rij is the
zero-order correlation between the ith and jth exogenous variable.
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